Linux logo The Rust for Linux project is working on adding support for the Rust language to the Linux kernel with the hope that using Rust will make new code more safe, easier to refactor and review, and easier to write. (See the RFC for more detail about goals and for the varied responses of the Linux Kernel community.)

Back in April, I took a look at whether we could use our Rust verification tools on the Rust for Linux repo to provide further safety. Most of our work is based on the KLEE symbolic execution tool and I was able to get that to work. For reasons, I did not get to explore this very deeply after that but I thought it would be useful to describe what I was able to do and some of the questions raised by the work as a guide to how you might tackle the problem in the future.

I have split this blog into three parts because it was getting quite long. In this part, I’ll start by looking at some key questions around what properties and code we want to check. The second part, will dive deeply into how to build Rust-for-Linux in a way that you can use KLEE on it. (Many people will want to skip this part.) And the final part, will return to the questions by creating test harnesses and stubs that could be used to check the Rust-for-Linux code for bugs.

I gave a talk about this work at Kangrejos on 2021-09-13. You can see the slides here.

As with the previous post on using KLEE with CoreUtils, my goal in this post is to help others to use tools from the formal verification community to check code like this rather than to do that checking myself. In particular, I will not find any bugs, I will not attempt to provide evidence that this is worth doing and I will not create a verification system that is ready to integrate into any project. These (and other limitations listed at the end of the last post) all need to be fixed before I would recommend that you try to use these tools as part of your regular workflow. But, I hope that this series will give you an idea of what needs to be done and the problems that need to be fixed in the future.

One other important thing to note is that the Rust compiler moves very fast and this causes problems for verification tools. In particular, what I describe is based on KLEE that recently added support for LLVM-11 but the latest Rust compiler relies on LLVM-12. All the detailed instructions are therefore for an older version of Rust for Linux from late May instead of the current version.1

What properties would we like to verify?

I think that there are four types of property that we might want to check: safety checks; invariants; parameterized checks; and functional correctness.

(Spoiler: in my experiment I only scraped the surface of safety checks and parameterized checking.)

Safety checks

Rust’s type system is able to statically check for many problems that go unchecked in C or C++ code. And some of Rust’s language features support good software engineering practice to mitigate issues around things like “unsafe” code where the compiler cannot perform such strong checks: allowing tricky code to be isolated into areas that can be carefully reviewed instead of spreading them evenly through the codebase. This drastically reduces the need to verify low-level properties such as null pointer checks, use-after-free, locking issues, etc. While these issues are not completely eliminated, they are probably not the highest priority for Rust code.

Part of Rust’s safety is achieved through dynamic checks inserted by the compiler in debug mode. For example, array bounds checks and integer overflow checks. These are problematic because failing a check triggers a kernel panic from which there is no good recovery. If you do not catch the panic, you have to reboot the kernel: losing unsaved data, ejecting users from the system and affecting other systems that rely on this one. If you try to catch the panic, you risk leaving data structures in an inconsistent state which will cause subtle failures and potential data corruption later. Neither is entirely satisfactory and there are strong opinions on which of these two bad options is better or worse.

There is clearly a need to identify dynamic checks that can never fail and dynamic checks that could potentially fail. We can (and probably should) look for checks that can fail using testing and fuzzing but formal verification tools have the unique ability to persuade us that none of the checks can fail. And, if none of the checks can fail, then we can turn off the dynamic checks safe in the knowledge that it makes no difference.2

System invariants

Going further, the correct functioning of system software often relies on a large number of invariants, it is important that all parts of the system preserves those invariants, and code changes will inevitably result in inconsistencies. Again, the Rust language can help avoid this by making it easier to isolate all the code that touches a data structure in one place using more powerful abstraction features and it can enforce this isolation using the module system.

But, sometimes the code that preserves an invariant is unavoidably smeared over a very large amount of code. And, sometimes, the invariant is extremely subtle or hard to ensure. So we might also want to specify and then check system invariants.

For checking system invariants, it is certainly nice if a formal verification tool can catch all violations or persuade us that the code is correct but, if possible, we should also aim to use testing and fuzzing. One way to do this is to write the invariants as executable Rust code: we can then insert debug-mode checks (i.e., assert!) at key places in the code and check the invariants multiple ways.

Functional correctness and parameterized checks

Ideally, of course, we would like to check that the code does what it is supposed to (i.e., that it is “functionally correct”). To do this, we need a specification of what Linux is supposed to do – and that’s where the problem starts…

  • There is no specification of Linux.

  • Creating a specification of Linux as we wish it was would be a huge amount of work (that nobody is likely to do).

  • Correcting the specification to match the aspects of Linux that people rely on (even if they are not “ideal”) would be a huge amount of work with a very long tail as one dependency after another is discovered and some hypothetical Linux specification committee argues over whether that dependency is a bug or a feature.

  • Fixing remaining divergences between the specification and the Linux codebase would be a huge amount of work.

  • Linux would continue to evolve while a specification is being built.

  • If you want the specification and the code to be in sync with each other, then the specification and testing/verifying activities act as a brake on development: you have to agree the changes to the specification before or as you are changing the code. It is hard to imagine that this would be acceptable.

Note that there is nothing special about Linux in the above: it is true for any major software system and, especially for any system that has a single implementation.3

One way round this situation is to weaken the goals: instead of aiming to specify exactly what Linux should do for any sequence of system calls, I/O, etc. we could, instead, specify some aspects of how some sequences of system calls should behave.

As an example of how this might work, if we believe that a particular system call cannot ever return some error code, we could write a parameterized check that executes some sequence of operations, invokes the system call under test and then asserts that the result is not the forbidden error code. A traditional test would try this for a few important sequences and function arguments. A parameterized check extends this by taking the sequences and function arguments as parameters which allows you to use the same check for both fuzzing or for formal verification. (These dual-use parameterized checks are a key part of our overall project and we wrote a paper about the overall strategy.)

What code do we want to check?

The hardest bugs to find and deal with often result from misunderstandings between different teams and from one part of the system being changed without making corresponding changes elsewhere. One of the biggest opportunities for misunderstandings and divergence in Rust for Linux is between the C code and the Rust code in Linux. It would therefore be great to check the entire system at once so that we flush out disagreements between the Rust code and the C code.

But, there is a lot of C code in Linux and we cannot possibly consider all of it without the goal of “verify Rust for Linux” turning into “verify all of Linux”. So, for now, we should focus on the Rust code and recognise that we are leaving a major potential source of bugs for another time when we see a way to make it manageable.

The Rust code in Rust for Linux interacts with “rLinux” (the rest of Linux)4 in two major ways:

  1. Calling into rLinux services to do things like allocate memory, take a lock, print a message or register a device driver.

  2. rLinux invokes Rust code through module initialization/finalization functions, virtual function tables provided by device drivers, etc. This is accomplished through some wrapper code that converts C data structures and idiomatic C APIs to idiomatic Rust data structures and APIs.

A large part of Rust for Linux consists of glue code that makes these interactions safe and idiomatic. We have a choice of whether to include this glue code in our verification or to focus on verifying device drivers, etc. that interact with this glue code. There are three competing forces that influence our decision:

1) We would like to verify as much Rust code as possible. So we should try not to exclude any Rust code.

2) Wherever we draw the boundary between C and Rust, we will have to create stub functions of the code that we exclude. To minimize work, we should choose a boundary that is small, is well documented and is stable.

3) When writing parameterized checks, we would prefer to interact with an idiomatic Rust interface so that we can exploit the Rust type system, traits, etc. in our checks.

There is probably no right answer here but, for now, it looks as though we should include almost all of the glue code that invokes rLinux services but that we should exclude the glue code that wraps Rust code in C API and C data structures.

Should we use Cargo?

The obvious way to build the code is to tweak the existing Linux build system. This is the most flexible if we want to start verifying more of the Linux C code. But it has one huge disadvantage: the Rust for Linux code is not built using Cargo so we lose a lot of the Cargo features that we are used to using. In particular, our cargo-verify tool behaves like cargo test and it invokes Cargo as part of its execution so, if we don’t use Cargo, we will need to achieve the same results using Makefiles, etc.

I don’t know what the best choice is here. It would be convenient to use Cargo and cargo-verify but it turns out that kernel code is a bit simpler to compile than normal Rust crates so it is not unbearable to avoid Cargo. So, for now, I will just tweak the Makefiles in the kernel.5

One major disadvantage of not using Cargo is that it makes it harder to use the libraries that we have developed elsewhere in the RVT project. In the third part of this series, we will resort to copying those files into Rust for Linux as a crude workaround and we will only use the simplest library.


The Rust language has great promise as a safer systems programming language and the Rust for Linux project is working hard on demonstrating that promise in the context of the Linux kernel. This series of posts is looking at how we can further improve safety.

In this first part of the series, I looked at some key questions around what properties we might want to check (and what does not seem realistic to consider). And I looked at how much of the codebase we might want to check: just device drivers, and other extensions written in Rust; the Rust infrastructure that supports these extensions; and/or the interaction between Rust and the remainder of Linux (written in C).

In the remaining two parts, I will give detailed build instructions for using KLEE with the Rust for Linux codebase and I will show how we can build simple verification frameworks. (However, this series of posts will stop short of showing a ready to use method or even recommending that you start using it yet. I leave this for the future.)

  1. If you want to update this to work with the current version of Rust for Linux, I have another branch that compiles but, since I was not able to use KLEE, it is untested and it has not been cleaned up to make it suitable for merging into the main branch. But it may be useful as a guide to what needs to be changed. 

  2. More realistically, what is likely to happen is that tools find some checks that could fail (and we fix them), some checks that can’t fail (and we eliminate them). And then we are left with checks that are too hard for an automatic tool to reason about. For these, we are forced to either turn to other approaches such as interactive theorem proving, manual reasoning, very thorough testing and fuzzing, or simplifying the code. (Simplifying the code would be the best option if possible.) 

  3. Just because all of Linux cannot possibly be specified does not mean that individual parts of Linux cannot be specified. There is no reason why relatively isolated parts such as device drivers, network stacks or filesystems could not be formally specified and even verified. 

  4. For convenience, I made up the shortened name “rLinux” to refer to the “rest of Linux”: those parts of Linux that are not written in Rust. The name is inspired by the Scottish Government’s use of the term “rUK” to refer to all the parts of the United Kingdom that are not Scotland. 

  5. It turns out that it is hard to integrate cargo into the build systems found at large companies where that use massively parallel compilation farms, compiled code is stored on a massive distributed shared database, there is a substantial investment in C++, Java/Kotlin, PHP or whatever, and all code coming into the company has to be reviewed to prevent supply-chain attacks.

    So, if you are like me and you are developing tools that should be usable both with conventional cargo-based development and some other build system, it is good practice to use something other than cargo every now and then to understand the issues you will face later. And, compared with what you find in large companies, the Linux makefiles are relatively simple to work with :-)